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Abstract—Spam mitigation can be broadly classified into two
main approaches: a) centralized security infrastructures that
rely on a limited number of trusted monitors to detect and
report malicious traffic; and b) highly distributed systems that
leverage the experiences of multiple nodes within distinct trust
domains. The first approach offers limited threat coverage and
slow response times, and it is often proprietary. The second
approach is not widely adopted, partly due to the lack of
guarantees regarding the trustworthiness of nodes that comprise
the system.
Our proposal, SocialFilter, aims to achieve the trustworthiness
of centralized security services and the wide coverage, respon-
siveness and inexpensiveness of large-scale collaborative spam
mitigation. We propose a large-scale distributed system that
enables clients with no email classification functionality to query
the network on the behavior of a host. A SocialFilter node builds
trust for its peers by auditing their behavioral reports and by
leveraging the social network of SocialFilter administrators. The
node combines the confidence its peers have in their own reports
and the trust it places on its peers to derive the likelihood that
a host is spamming.
The simulation-based evaluation of our approach indicates its
potential under a real-world deployment: during a simulated
spam campaign, SocialFilternodes characterized 92% of spam
bot connections with confidence greater than 50%, while yielding
no false positives.
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of the currently deployed spam email mitiga-
tion techniques rely on centralized infrastructures and place
trust on a small number of security authorities. For instance,
email systems and browsers rely heavily on a few centralized
IP reputation services (e.g., [5], [6], [30]).
Unfortunately, centralized services often maintain out-dated
blacklists [28], offering a rather large window of opportunity
to spammers. Moreover, the vantage points of centralized
services are limited in numbers, but attacks launched using
large botnets are becoming increasingly surreptitious. In those
attacks, one malicious host may attack multiple domains, each
for a short period of time [20], [27], reducing the effectiveness
of spam traffic detection with a small number of vantage
points. Finally, the use of such email blacklisting services
requires subscribing for a nominal fee when the service is
proprietary (e.g., Cloudmark [1] or TrustedSource [5].)
Motivated by this problem, researchers have proposed col-
laborative peer-to-peer spam filtering platforms [37], [38]
to achieve rapid and reliable detection and suppression of
unwanted traffic. These early systems assumed compliant be-
havior from all participating reporters of spam, which is hardly
true given the heterogeneity of the Internet and the fact that
reporters may belong to distinct trust domains. Compromised
hosts controlled by attackers may join the system, polluting
the detection mechanisms. In addition, honest reporters may
become compromised after they join the system.
To this end, we propose a collaborative spam filtering
system (SocialFilter) that uses social trust embedded in Online
Social Networks (OSN) to evaluate the trustworthiness of
spam reporters. It relies upon the observation that adjacent
users in a social network tend to trust each other more than
random pairs of users in the network. SocialFilter aims at
aggregating the experiences of multiple security authorities,
democratizing spam mitigation. It is a trust layer that exports
the likelihood that a host is spamming. Thus it enables nodes
with no spam detection capability to collect the experiences of
nodes with such capability and use them to classify connection
requests from unknown email servers.
Each SocialFilter node submits spammer reports, i.e. secu-
rity alerts regarding Internet hosts identified by their IP address
to a centralized repository peers (Section III). The goal of
the system is to ensure that the spammer reports reach other
SocialFilter nodes prior to spamming hosts contacting those
nodes, and that the spammer reports are sufficiently credible
to warrant action by their receivers. Each node associates
a trust score to its peers and uses this score to assess the
trustworthiness of the reports originated by them.
SocialFilter uses social trust to bootstrap direct trust as-
sessments, and then employs a lightweight reputation system
[16], [22] to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes and their
spammer reports (Section III-B). Our insight is that each node
will be administered by human administrators (admins), and
nodes maintained by trusted admins are likely to disseminate
trustworthy reports. Therefore, a SocialFilter node may obtain
a direct trust assessment with a number of nodes with whom
its admin has social relationships. Social relationships between
admins can be obtained from massive OSN providers, such as
Facebook and LinkedIn.
However, reputation systems are known to be vulnerable to
the Sybil attack [10]. Sybil attacks subvert distributed systems
by introducing numerous malicious identities under the con-
trol of an adversary. By using these identities the adversary
acquires disproportional influence over the system. To mitigate
this attack, SocialFilter again uses the social network to assess
the probability that a node is a Sybil attacker, i.e. its identity
uniqueness (Section III-A). Each node’s identity is associated
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social network using a SybilLimit-like technique [34], which
can effectively identify Sybils among social network users.
SocialFilter nodes use both the identity uniqueness and the
reputation of another node to assess the overall trustworthiness
of that node’s report. The originator of a spammer report
itself also assigns a confidence level to the report, as traffic
classification has a level of uncertainty. The trustworthiness of
a node and its confidence level in a report determines whether
a node should trust a report or ignore it. Trusted reports can be
used for diverse purposes, depending on the node’s function.
For example, email servers can use them to automatically filter
out email messages that originate from IPs that have been
designated as spammers with high confidence. IDS systems
can use them to block SMTP packets that originate from
suspicious IPs.
A recent unwanted traffic mitigation system, 0stra [23],
combat unwanted traffic by forcing it to traverse social links
the capacity of which imposes a rate-limit over the commu-
nication. Unlike Ostra, SocialFilter does not use social links
to rate-limit unwanted traffic. Instead it utilizes social links to
bootstrap trust between nodes and to suppress Sybil attacks.
However, Ostra can result in legitimate email being blocked
(false positives), which is highly undesirable.
We evaluate our design (Section IV) using a 50K-node
sample of the Facebook social network. We demonstrate
through simulation that collaborating SocialFilter nodes are
able to suppress common types of unwanted traffic in a reliable
and responsive manner. Our simulations show that in a 50K-
node SocialFilter network with only 10% of nodes having
spam classification capability, nodes with no local spam detec-
tion capability are able to identify 92% of connections from
spammers with greater than 50% confidence. Our experimental
comparison with Ostra shows that our approach is slightly less
effective in suppressing spam, while in contrast to Ostra, it
yields no false positives. Given the severity of the problem
of false spam positives, we believe that SocialFilter can be a
better alternative under many scenarios.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we provide a high-level description of our
system and the security challenges it addresses.
A. SocialFilter Components
Figure 1 depicts SocialFilter’s architecture. At a high-level,
the SocialFilter system comprises the following components:
1) human users that administer networked devices/networks
(admins) and join a social network; 2) end systems (Social-
Filter nodes) that are administered by specific admins and
participate in monitoring and reporting the behavior of email
senders; 3) spammer reports submitted by SocialFilter nodes
concerning email senders they observe; 4) direct trust updates
made available by SocialFilter nodes reporting their perceived
trustworthiness of their peers; and 5) a centralized repository
that receives and stores spammer reports and trust updates.
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Figure 1. SocialFilter architecture.
The same admin that administers a SocialFilter node also
administers a group of applications that interface with the
node to report spamming behavior. Interfacing applications can
either be SMTP servers or IDS systems [25] that register with
the SocialFilter repository or users of a webmail service. In
the first case SMTP servers can classify spam by using their
email characterization functionality (host reputation services
such as TrustedSource [5], CloudMark [1] and DShield [36],
or content-based filters). In the second case, the interfacing
application is essentially a human user who reports an email
(and consequently its originating email server) as spam.
B. Spammer Reports
An email characterization application uses the
ReportSpammer(hostIP, confidence) call of the
SocialFilter node RPC API to feedback its observed behavior
for an email sender. The first argument identifies the source,
i.e., an IP address. The second argument is the confidence
with which the application is reporting that the specified entity
is a spammer. The latter takes values in 0% to 100% and
reflects the fact that in many occasions traffic classification
has a level of uncertainty. For example, a mail server that
sends both spam and legitimate email may or may not be a
spamming host.
In turn, the SocialFilter node submits a corresponding
spammer report to the repository to share its experience with
its peers. For example, if a node i’s spam analysis indicates
that half of the emails received from host with IP I are spam,
i reports:
[spammer report] I, 50%
In addition, SocialFilter nodes are able to revoke spammer
reports by updating them. If for example at a latter time, i
determines that no spam originates from I , it sends a new
report in which it updates the confidence value from 50%
to 0%. Nodes can authenticate with both the repository and
the OSN provider using standard single-sign-on authentication
techniques, e.g., [11], [31] or Facebook Connect [4].
3C. Determining whether a Host is Spamming
Each node assigns a peer trust value to each of its peers in
the network. This trust value determines the trustworthiness
of the peer’s spammer reports. The peer trust is determined
using two dimensions of trust: a) reporter trust; and b) identity
uniqueness. We describe these two dimensions below. The
receiver of a spammer report derives its confidence in the
correctness of the received report from the report’s confidence
and the peer trust.
Nodes collectively compute reporter trust values by em-
ploying a reputation management mechanism. This mechanism
relies on SocialFilter nodes verifying each other’s spammer
reports to derive individual direct trust values (Section III-B).
If a node i is able to verify the spammer reports of node j it
can determine a direct trust value dij . The SocialFilter nodes
share these values with other nodes by exchanging direct trust
updates. For reasons of scalability and efficiency, a node i
considers the spammer reports of only a (possibly random)
subset Vi (including itself) of all the nodes in the SocialFilter
network. Consequently, nodes submit and retrieve direct trust
updates only for nodes in Vi. We refer to Vi as node’s i view.
Our system also relies on the fact that nodes comprising
Internet systems such as email servers, honeypots, IDS etc are
administered by human admins. These human users maintain
accounts in online social networks (OSN). SocialFilter lever-
ages OSNs in the following two ways: a) it defends against
Sybil attacks [10] by exploiting the fact that OSNs can be
used for resource testing, where the test in question is a Sybil
attacker’s ability to create and sustain acquaintances. Depend-
ing on the result of the test, the OSN provider assigns an
identity uniqueness value to the admin; and b) It initializes the
direct trust values in the absence of prior interactions between
SocialFilter nodes, by considering the trust that is inferred by
associations in the social network of administrators.
Finally, an application can use the IsSpammer(hostIP)
call of the SocialFilter node RPC API to obtain a value that
corresponds to the likelihood of the hostIP being spamming.
The node derives this value by aggregating spammings reports
regarding hostIP. These reports are weighted by the reporting
node’s peer trust.
D. Security Challenges
SocialFilter is a collaborative platform aiming at suppress-
ing malicious traffic. In addition, it is an open system, meaning
that any admin with a social network account and a device can
join. As such, it is reasonable to assume that SocialFilter itself
will be targeted to disrupt its operation. Our system faces the
following security challenges:
False Spammer Reports. Malicious SocialFilter nodes may
issue false or forged reports aiming at reducing the system’s
ability to detect spam or disrupting legitimate email traffic.
False Direct Trust Updates. To address false spammer
reports, SocialFilteremploys a reporter reputation system to
determine the amount of trust that should be placed on
each user’s reports. However, the reputation system itself is
vulnerable to false reporting as malicious nodes may send false
or forged direct trust updates.
Sybil Attack. An adversary may attempt to create multiple
SocialFilter identities aiming at increasing its ability to subvert
the system using false spammer reports and direct trust up-
dates. Defending against Sybil attacks without a trusted central
authority is hard. Many decentralized systems try to cope with
Sybil attacks by binding an identity to an IP address. However,
malicious users can readily harvest IP addresses through BGP
hijacking [27] or by commanding a large botnet.
III. SOCIALFILTER DESIGN
We now present in more detail the design of our system.
A. OSN Providers as Sybil Mitigating Authorities
For an open system such as SocialFilter to operate reliably,
node accountability in the form of node authentication and
prevention of Sybil attacks is of the utmost importance.
We propose to leverage existing OSN repositories as inex-
pensive, Sybil-mitigating authorities. OSNs are ideally posi-
tioned to perform such function: Using SybilLimit-like [34]
techniques (see Section III-A1) to perform inexpensive re-
source tests on the social graph, OSNs can determine the
amount of confidence one can place on a node’s identity. We
refer to this confidence as identity uniqueness.
Each node that participates in SocialFilter is administered
by human users that have accounts with OSN providers. The
system needs to ensure that each user’s social network identity
is closely coupled with its SocialFilter node. To this end,
SocialFilter single sign-on authentication mechanisms, such
as Facebook Connect, to associate the OSN account with the
spammer report and direct trust update repository account.
1) Determining the Identity Uniqueness: When malicious
users create numerous fake online personas, SocialFilter’s host
trust metric can be subverted. Specifically, a malicious user a
with high reporter trust with another user u may create Sybils
and assign high direct trust to them. As a result, all the Sybils
of the attacker would gain high reporter trust with user u.
There is typically one-to-one correspondence between a real
user’s social network identity and its real identity. Although,
malicious users can create many identities, they can establish
only a limited number of trust relationships with real humans.
Thus, groups of Sybil attackers are connected to the rest of
the social graph with a disproportionally small number of
edges. The first works to exploit this property was SybilGuard
and SybilLimit [34], [35], which bound the number of Sybil
identities using a fully distributed protocol.
Based on a similar concept, SocialFilter’s Sybil detection
algorithm determines the uniqueness of a SocialFilter user’s
identity. This algorithm is executed solely by the OSN provider
over its centrally maintained social graph. An admin’s i
identity is considered weak if it has not established a sufficient
number of real relationship’s over the social network. Upon
being queried by an admin v, the OSN provider returns a value
in [0.0, 1.0], which specifies the confidence of the provider that
4a specific node s is not participating in a Sybil attack, i.e. the
probability that s is not part of a network of Sybils.
First, we provide some informal background on the theo-
retical justification of SybilGuard and SybilLimit. It is known
that randomly-grown topologies such as social networks and
the web are fast mixing small-world topologies [7], [18],
[33]. Thus in the social graph I with n nodes, a walk
of Θ(
√
n logn) steps contains Θ(
√
n) independent samples
approximately drawn from the stationary distribution. When
we draw random walks from a verifier node v and the suspect
s, if these walks remain in a region of the network that
honest nodes reside, both walks draw Θ(
√
n) independent
samples from roughly the same distribution. It follows from
the generalized Birthday Paradox [35] that they intersect with
high probability. The opposite holds if the suspect resides in
a region of Sybil attackers that is not well-connected to the
region of honest nodes.
SybilGuard replaces random walks with “random routes”
and a verifier node accepts the suspect if random routes
originating from both nodes intersect. In random routes, each
node uses a pre-computed random permutation as a one-to-
one mapping from incoming edges to outgoing edges. Each
random permutation generates a unique routing table at each
node. As a result, two random routes entering an honest
node along the same edge will always exit along the same
edge (“convergence property”). This property guarantees that
random routes from a Sybil region that is connected to the
honest region through a single edge will traverse only one
distinct path, further reducing the probability that a Sybil’s
random routes will intersect with a verifier’s random routes.
SybilLimit [34] is a near-optimal improvement over the Sybil-
Guard algorithm. In SybilLimit, a node accepts another node
only if random routes originating from both nodes intersect
at their last edge. For two honest nodes to have at least one
intersected last edge with high probability, the required number
of the random routes from each node should be approximately
r = Θ(
√
m), where m is the number of edges in I. The length
of the random routes should be w = O(log n).
With SocialFilter’s SybilLimit-like technique the OSN
provider computes an identity uniqueness score for each node
s in the social graph I. At initialization time, the OSN provider
selects l random verifier nodes. It also creates 2r independent
instances of pre-computed random permutation as a one-to-
one mapping from incoming edges to outgoing edges (routing
table). The first r routing tables are used to draw random routes
from suspect nodes s and the rest r routing tables are used
to draw random routes from the verifier nodes v. SybilLimit
uses distinct routing tables for verifiers and suspects in order
to avoid undesirable correlation between the verifiers’ random
routes and the suspects’ random routes. For each s, the OSN
provider runs the SybilLimit-like algorithm is as follows:
1) For each of the l verifiers v, it picks a random neighbor
of v. It draws along the random neighbors r random
routes of length w = O(log n), for each instance of the
r routing tables, where n is the number of nodes in I. It
stores the last edge (tail) of each verifier random route.
2) It picks a random neighbor of s and draws along it r
random routes of length w = O(log n), for each instance
of the nodes’ routing tables. It stores the last edge (tail)
of each suspect random route. We refer to steps (1) and
(2) of the algorithm as random routing.
3) For each verifier v, if one tail from s intersects one tail
from v, that verifier v is considered to “accept” s. We
refer to this step as verification.
4) It computes the ratio of the number of verifiers that
accept s over the total number of verifiers l. That ratio
is the computed identity uniqueness score ids.
Nodes query the OSN provider for the identity unique-
ness of their peers. The OSN provider performs the above
computations periodically and off-line to accommodate for
topology changes. The OSN provider stores the result of this
computation for each node as a separate attribute.
B. Determining the Reporter Trust
Malicious nodes may issue false spammer reports to ma-
nipulate the trust towards entities. In addition, misconfigured
nodes may also issue erroneous reports. SocialFilter can mit-
igate the negative impact of incorrect reports by assigning
higher weights to reports obtained from more trustworthy
SocialFilter nodes.
Conceptually, each SocialFilter node i maintains a reporter
trust value rtij to every other node j in its view, j ∈ Vi\i. This
trust score corresponds to node i’s estimation of the probability
that node j’s reports are accurate. It is obtained from three
sources: trust attainable from online social networks, direct
spammer report verification, and transitive trust.
First, SocialFilter relies on the fact that SocialFilter nodes
are administered by human users. Competent and benign users
are likely to maintain their nodes secure, and provide honest
and truthful reports. The trust on the competency and honesty
of human users could be obtained via social networks. Social-
Filter admins maintain accounts in online social networks. An
admin i tags her acquaintance admin j with a social trust score
stij in [0.0, 1.0] based on her belief on j’s ability to manage
her node(s). This value is used to initialize a direct trust score
between two nodes i and j: dij = stij .
Second, a SocialFilter node i dynamically updates the direct
trust dij by comparing spammer reports submitted by the node
j with its own submitted reports. A node i may verify a report
from a node j for an entity e, if i has also recently interacted
with the same entity. i may also probabilistically choose to
observe e solely for the purpose of verifying reports of another
node j. The portion of the received spammer reports that the
SocialFilter nodes verify is a tunable parameter. Intuitively, if
i and j share similar opinions on e, i should have a high trust
in j’s reports. Let vkij be a measure of similarity in [0, 1.0]
between i and j’s kth report. A node i updates its direct trust
to j using an exponential moving average:
dk+1ij = α ∗ dkij + (1− α) ∗ vk+1ij (1)
As i verifies a large number of reports from j, the direct
trust metric dkij gradually converges to the similarity of reports
5from i and j.
By updating dij and making it available for retrieval to other
nodes, i enables its peers j ∈ Vi to build their reporter trust
graph Tj(Vj , Ej). The reporter trust graph of a node i consists
of only the nodes in its view Vi, and its directed edge set Ei
consists of the direct trust duv for each u, v ∈ Vi. If a node
u has not released a direct trust update for a node v, duv is
treated as being equal to 0.0.
Third, a node i incorporates direct trust and transitive
trust [13], [14] to obtain i’s overall trust to j: rtij . We use
transitive trust for the following main reasons: a) due to the
large number of nodes, the admin of a node i may not assign
a social trust sij to the admin of a node j, as they may not be
acquainted; b) due to the large number of email-sending hosts,
nodes i and j may not have encountered the same hosts and
are therefore unable to directly verify each other’s reports; and
c) i can further improve the accuracy of its trust metric for j
by learning the opinions of other SocialFilter nodes about j.
The overall reporter trust rtij can be obtained as the maximum
trust path in node i’s reporter trust graph Ti(Vi, Ei), in which
each edge u→ v is annotated by the direct trust duv . That is,
for each path p ∈ P , where P is the set of all paths between
nodes i and j:
rtij = maxp∈P (Πu→v∈pduv) (2)
We use the maximum trust path because it can be effi-
ciently computed with Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm in
O(|E| log |V |) time for a sparse T . In addition, it yields
larger trust values than the minimum or average trust path,
resulting in faster convergence to high confidence regarding
the actions entities perform. Finally, it mitigates the effect of
misbehaving nodes under-reporting their trust towards honest
nodes. Messages that appear spamming to a node may not
appear so to all other nodes in the system. For example a
compromised host may send spam to certain hosts, but at the
same time may send legitimate emails to others. Therefore the
subjective local trust metric we use is more appropriate than
a global trust metric, such as Eigentrust’s [19].
The false direct trust update attack mentioned in Sec-
tion II-D may manifest in two ways. First, a misbehaving
reporter x in a node’s w view sends false direct trust updates
regarding another node y in w’s view. Second, a source of
spam s sends good traffic to node x and spam traffic to node
y, while node x verifies y’s reports. As a result x will perceive
y as not being trustworthy. Thus, a node w that has both x and
y in its view would incur the false direct trust update attack.
If for example node w trusts x by 1.0 and node x trusts y by
0.0, w would trust y by 0.0 and would no longer consider its
reports valid, although y’s reports are correct. However, our
design is inherently resilient to this attack as we demonstrate in
Section IV-D (Figure 5(a)): if the node w has many neighbors
and possibly alternative trust paths to y or receives spammer
reports from a large number of nodes in its view, this attack is
mitigated. Also this attack would have an effect only against
nodes that have both x and y in their view. In addition, the
attacker should have a legitimate reason to send traffic to x.
C. Determining the Likelihood of a Host being Spammer
As mentioned above, a SocialFilter node i may receive mul-
tiple spammer reports originating from multiple nodes j ∈ Vi
and concerning the same host h for the same action a. Each
report concerning h is marked with the level of confidence
cj(h) of the reporter j. For example, this confidence may be
equal to the portion of emails received by host h that are
spam ( [30]). Subsequently, i needs to aggregate the spammer
reports to determine an overall likelihood IsSpammer(h that
h is a spam bot.
When a node i that does not have entity classification func-
tionality receives multiple reports concerning the same host
h, it derives the overall likelihood IsSpammer(h) weighing
the spammer reports’ confidence by the peer trust of their
reporters:
IsSpammer(h) =
Σj∈Vi\i rtij idj cj(h)
Σj∈Vi\i rtij idj
(3)
If applications interfacing with node i have entity classifi-
cation functionality, and sent to i spammer reports through the
ReportSpammer() interface, i considers only these reports in
calculating the trust for an entity. When i receives spammer
reports by more than one applications for the same h, the
confidence that the node has in h is the average (possibly
weighted) of these applications’ reports. Node i uses this
average confidence to compute the similarity of its reports with
the reports its peers. When a node i receives a new spammer
report for h, this new report preempts an older report, which
is thereafter ignored.
Each spammer report carries a timestamp. The time interval
T during which a spammer report is valid is a tunable system
parameter. Reports for which current−time−timestamp >
T are not considered in the calculation of the likelihood
of a host being spamming. We assume lose synchronization
between SocialFilter nodes.
D. SocialFilter Repository
A node can exchange spammer reports and direct trust
updates with any other node in the SocialFilter network re-
gardless of whether the admins of the nodes are acquaintances
in the social network. With this design choice, we ensure that
spammer reports and direct trust updates reach the interested
nodes on time, improving the threat coverage of our system.
We also enable users that are not well-connected in the social
network to peer with other trustworthy nodes.
Our centralized repository consists of two parts, one for
spammer reports and one for direct trust updates. The portion
of the repository tasked with maintaining spammer reports
is implemented as a hash table. Nodes store and retrieve
spammer reports concerning nodes in their view. When a node
queries for spammer reports, it is interested on the reports for
a single entity/action pair. These reports are sent by multiple
nodes, thus for efficiency it is reasonable to index(key) them
based on the hash of the concatenation of the entity’s ID (e.g.,
IP) and the action description.
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Figure 2. Example of the operation of a small SocialFilter network.
When a node i encounters a specific entity, it queries the
repository for all the spammer reports that involve the entity
and the action. Once it locates the node that stores those
reports it asks the node for those reports that originate from
nodes in Vi \ i.
On the other hand, a node needs to retrieve all the direct
trust updates involving all the nodes in its view. Thus, it is
reasonable to also implement the direct trust update repository
as a hash table indexed by the ID of the node that issues the
update. A node i needs to explicitly query for the existence
of an update involving all node pairs in its view. Thus every
time interval D, a node i requests from the repository for
each node j ∈ Vi \ i for the current non-zero direct trust
values djv for v ∈ Vi. Using these direct trust values i can
build the trust graph of its view Vi Ti(Vi, Ei). If the difference
between the current direct trust metric djv and the last djv
i retrieved from repository is greater than ǫ, the repository
includes this update in his reply to i’s request for direct trust
updates. The constant ǫ is used to ensure that the repository
does not incur the overhead of communicating the update if
it is not sufficiently large.
E. SocialFilter Operation Example
Figure 2 depicts an example of the operation of a small
SocialFilter network. The network includes an IDS node
tasked with checking incoming TCP connections for whether
they originate from spamming hosts, SocialFilter node 3. That
node has no inherent email classification functionality, thus it
relies on the other two nodes, 1 and 2, for early warning about
spam bots. Node 1 relies on human users to classify emails
as spam. In this example, the human user has classified half
of the emails originating from host with IP=128.195.169.1 as
spamming, therefore it reports that this host is spamming with
confidence c1(IP ) = 50%. Node 2 is an email server that
has subscription to a proprietary blacklisting service. In this
example Node 2 received a connection request from the host
with IP=128.195.169.1, it queried the reputation service and
got a response that this host is spamming. Thereby, node 2
reports with confidence c2(IP ) = 100% confidence that the
host is a spam bot.
Node 3 maintains the depicted reporter trust graph, derived
from its 5-node view. This view includes nodes 1 and 2, which
sent the depicted spammer reports. It also includes nodes 4
and 5, which did not sent any reports in this example. The
weighted directed edges in the graph correspond to the direct
trust between the peers in node 3’s view. From the reporter
trust graph and Equation 2, the maximum trust path between
nodes 3 and 1 traverses nodes 5 and 1 yielding rt31 = 0.4. The
maximum trust path between 3 and 2 traverses nodes 5, 4 and 2
and yields reporter trust rt32 = 0.648. The identity uniqueness
of nodes 1 and 2 has been computed by the OSN provider to
be id1 = 0.9 and id2 = 0.8, respectively. We can now use
Equation 3 to compute the confidence IsSpammer(IP) that
the IDS interfacing with node 3 has that the host is spamming:
rt31id1c1(IP ) + rt32id2c2(IP )
rt31id1 + rt32id2
= 0.795
IV. EVALUATION
We evaluate SocialFilter’s ability to block spam traffic and
compare it to Ostra [23]. Ostra represents a different approach
to spam mitigation using social links, and the main goal of this
evaluation is to shed light on the benefits and drawbacks of
the two approaches.
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Before we proceed with the comparative evaluation, we first
provide an overview of Ostra. Ostra bounds the total amount
of unwanted communication a user can send based on the
number of trust relationships the user has and the amount
of communication that has been flagged as wanted by its
receivers. Similar to SocialFilter in Ostra, an OSN repository
maintains the social network. When a sender wishes to send
email to a receiver, it first has to obtain a cryptographic token
from the OSN repository. The OSN repository uses the credit
balances along the social links connecting the sender and the
receiver to determine whether a token can be issued. Each user
adjacent to a social link is assigned a credit balance, B, which
is unique for the link. B has an initial value of 0. Ostra also
maintains a per-link balance range [L,U ], with L ≤ 0 ≤ U ,
which limits the range of the users credit balance (i.e., always
L ≤ B ≤ U ). The balance and balance range for a user is
denoted as BUL . For instance, the link’s adjacent user’s state
2+5−4 denotes that the user’s current credit balance is 2, and it
can range between −4 and 5.
When a communication token is issued, Ostra requires that
there is a path between the sender and the receiver in the social
network. It then requires that for each link along the social path
the first adjacent nodes credit limit L is increased by one, and
the second adjacent nodes credit limit U is decreased by one.
This process propagates recursively from the sender to the
receiver along the social links. If this process results in any of
the links in the path to have adjacent nodes of which the credit
balances exceed the balance range, Ostra refuses to issue the
token. When the communication is classified by the receiver,
the credit limits L and U are restored to their previous state.
If the communication is marked as unwanted, one credit is
transferred from the balance of the first node of the link to the
balance of the second one. Eventually, the links that connect
spammers to their receivers have balance beyond the allowed
range and a spammer is prevented from sending email.
B. Evaluation Settings
For our evaluation, we use a large strongly connected com-
ponent sampled from Facebook, consisting of 50,000 nodes
and 442,772 symmetric links.
We use the SimPy 1.9.1 [24] simulation package to simulate
SocialFilter and Ostra under a scenario where the social
network is formed among the admins of email servers. We
assume that legitimate users usually send 3 emails per day.
80% and 13% of the legitimate emails are sent to sender’s
friends and sender’s friends of friends respectively, and the
destination of the rest 7% emails are randomly chosen by the
sender. There are some spammers, which also participate, in
the Ostra and SocialFilter network, sending 500 spam emails
per day each to random users in the network. In this evaluation
we set Ostra’s credit bounds equal to 5 (|L| = |U | = 5). These
settings are obtain from Ostra’s evaluation [23].
Several nodes can automatically classify spam emails. These
instant classifiers correspond to systems that detect spam by
subscribing to commercial blacklists, employ content-based
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Figure 3. Effectiveness of SocialFilter as a function of view size.
filters etc. These nodes can block spam email instantly. On
the other hand, normal users can classify an email only after
receiving/reading it. That is, the normal classification can be
delayed based on the behavior of the users (how frequently
they check their email). In our evaluation, 10% of users have
the ability of instant classification and the average delay of
the normal classification is 2 hours [23].
In SocialFilter, when a receiver classifies the email from a
sender as spam, it issues a behavioral report as
[spammer report] I, X%
, where I is the IP of the sender and X is the confidence of
this spammer report. The issued spammer reports are gathered
in the repository, and they are used when normal users with
no capability of instant classification receive connections from
previously unencountered hosts. Each node has a view which
is a subset of the SocialFilter network, and it only considers
the spammer reports issued by nodes in its view. In addition,
each view has pre-trusted users who have the capability of the
instant classification, and the behavior reports issued by them
are highly trustable. Therefore, classifier nodes shares their
experiences by issuing spammer reports, and normal nodes
use the reports to block spam from senders which they have
not encountered before. In this evaluation, the size of the view
is 500 and the size of the pre-trusted set is 20.
The reporter trust that a SocialFilter node place on others is
computed based on the direct trust value between each member
of the view. This direct trust is in turned computed based on
the similarity of the spammer reports by the two members
of the view. Based on this direct trust value, each member of
view gets the reporter trust value by using Dijkstra’s algorithm.
Then, if the overall trust metric calculated by the equation 3
is over 0.5, a user blocks the SMTP connection.
C. Spam Mitigation Effectiveness
Before comparing SocialFilter and Ostra, we investigate the
effectiveness of SocialFilter according to the size of view.
Figure 3(a) shows the spam mitigation capacity of SocialFilter
as a function of the size of view when the simulated time is 170
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hours. When the size of view is 100, SocialFilter blocks only
around 50% of spam email connections. On the other hand,
when the size of view is 1000, SocialFilter blocks about 95%
spam emails. Because spammers send spam emails to random
targets, as the size of a node’s view increases, the probability
that a member in the view encounters the spammer before the
spammer contacts the node increases. Additionally, once a user
can get the spammer report from members of its view, it can
block all the further spam emails from the detected spammers.
In order for a node to compute trustworthiness of email
senders by using spammer reports, it requires the reporter
trust for all the members in its view. The reporter trust is
computed each time a node checks the likelihood of an email
sender being spammer. The reporter trust is computed by using
Dijkstra’s algorithm and the complexity of this computation
on direct trust-annotated graph T (V,E) is O(|V |2log|V |). In
Figure 3(b), we show the computation time of the reporter trust
with varying view size. For the measurement, we use an Intel
Core Duo P8600, 2.4GHz CPU, 3MB L2 cache, 4GB RAM
machine, and use reporter trust computation code written in
Python 2.5.2. As the size of view increases, the computation
time increase significantly, even though the performance of
spam mitigation has already saturated with small size of
view. This result justifies our design choice to perform the
reporter trust computation at the nodes and not the centralized
repository. Because the reporter trust is computed each time a
node checks the trustworthiness of an email sender, a too large
view size may becomes a performance bottleneck for nodes.
Based on this results, we use 500 as the size of view hereafter.
Figure 4(a) presents the spam mitigation effectiveness com-
parison between SocialFilter and Ostra under a varying number
of spammers. We make two notes. The first one is that Ostra
suffers from a non-negligible false positive rate, and the second
one is that SocialFilter allows more spam emails when there
are small number of spammers.
In SocialFilter, a node only blocks an email sender only
if it has been explicitly reported as spammer by a member
of its view. In these results, we assume that there is no false
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
1
2
3
4
Bl
oc
ke
d 
Sp
am
 (%
)
Bl
oc
ke
d 
Le
gi
tim
at
e 
(%
)
Spammers (%)
SF-Spam
OSTRA-Spam
SF-Legitimate
OSTRA-Legitimate
(a) False Spammer Reports
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 500  1000  1500  2000  2500
1
2
3
4
Bl
oc
ke
d 
Sp
am
 (%
)
Bl
oc
ke
d 
Le
gi
tim
at
e 
(%
)
Sybils
SF-Spam
SF-Legitimate
OS-Spam
OS-Legitimate
(b) Sybil Attack
Figure 5. Effectiveness comparison of SocialFilter and Ostra under attacks.
0.5% nodes are spammers. Simulated time is 170h.
reporter, and there is no fake spammer report incriminating
legitimate users. This is the reason why SocialFilter does not
suffer from false positive. On the other hand, Ostra blocks all
the links on the path used by a spammer, and some legitimate
users can not send email because there is no available path in
the social network. When the number of spammers are 1% of
nodes, which is 500 spammers, around 0.6% of total normal
emails, which are about 6000 legitimate emails, can not be
sent.
Ostra blocks about 94% of spam connections regardless of
the number of spammers. Even though SocialFilter performs
well for large number of spammers, it only blocks about
80% of spam when the number of spammers is small, e.g.,
0.1% or 0.01%. The main reason is the pre-trusted users
which are included in every view. Once, a pre-trusted node
detects a spammer, every user can share the spammer report
generated by it. As the number of spammers increases, the
probability that pre-trusted users early detect some of them
increases. Because of this early detection, SocialFilter can
block more spam emails when the number of spammers
are bigger. Conversely, when the number of spammers is
smaller, it is hard to detect them early, and SocialFilter allows
proportionally more spam emails.
SocialFilter requires some time for a node to detect spam-
mers and during that time it allows some spam connections
to go through. But, once a user detects spammers via either
referring to its view or classifying email senders itself, it
will not allow any further spam emails. To illustrate this
characteristic, we show the performance with varying lengths
of simulated time in Figure 4(b). In Ostra, after the spam
blocking ratio becomes around 94%, it will not change any
more. On the other hand, in SocialFilter, despite the spam
blocking ratio being only 85% at 85 hours, it increases along
with the simulated time and finally it blocks around 96% spam
email on 680 hours. Eventually, unlike Ostra which suffers
from the false positive as well as allows a portion of spam,
almost all nodes in SocialFilter can block all the spam emails
without any false positives.
9D. SocialFilter’s Resilience to Attacks
Spammers can collude for their spam emails to evade
SocialFilter. First each spammer may not issue reports about
colluding spammers. Also each spammer falsely generates
behavior reports about legitimate users to induce SocialFilter
to block their emails. To cheat Ostra, each spammer classifies
a legitimate email and a spam email as unwanted email and
legitimate, respectively. Figure 5(a) shows the effectiveness of
SocialFilter and Ostra as a function of the number of colluding
spammers that reports falsely.
Although Ostra achieves the same effectiveness in blocking
spam connections as in the absence of false reporters, the
ratio of the false positives increases. Since Ostra does not
have any method to recognize false classifications, Ostra is
more adversely affected by the false reports. On the other
hand, SocialFilter achieves similar performance of blocking
spam emails, and the false positive rate due to false reports is
very limited. This is because false reporters obtain very low
direct trust to other legitimate users as their spammer reports
are different to reports of other legitimate users. Eventually,
the spammer reports issued by the false reporters are mostly
ignored by legitimate users.
Spammers may also create Sybil nodes to attack Social-
Filter. However, in SocialFilter, Sybil users gets very low
identity uniqueness, which becomes even lower as the number
of Sybil users increases. Thus, despite spammers using Sybils
that report falsely as well as send spam emails, SocialFilter is
resilient to this attack. We performed simulation with various
number of Sybil users and derived that that the performance of
of the system is not substantially affected negatively (Figure
5(b)). In Ostra, Sybil spammers are blocked easily because
the social links from the Sybils’ creators have already been
blocked. Although Ostra can block more spam emails, Ostra
still suffers from false positives.
V. RELATED WORK
We now discuss prior work that is pertinent to SocialFilter’s
design and is not discussed in the main body of the paper.
SocialFilter is inspired by prior work on reputation and trust
management systems [8], [16], [22]. Well-known trust and rep-
utation management systems include the rating scheme used
by the eBay on-line auction site, object reputation systems
for P2P file sharing networks [19], [32] and PageRank [9].
In contrary to the above systems, our system incorporates
social trust to mitigate false reporting and Sybil attacks. In
addition, SocialFilter’s view-based reporter trust scales better
than eigenvector-based trust metrics such as EigenTrust [19],
PageRank [9] and TrustRank [15] because direct trust values
between nodes change frequently and it would be expensive
to consider the complete trust graph. In addition, eigenvector-
based trust metrics do not provide an explicit confidence
metric for a node, but they only allow ranking the nodes
instead.
SocialFilter is simular to SpamHaus [6], DShield [2] and
TrustedSource [5] in that it has a centralized repository. It
differs in that it automates the process of evaluating reports
and assigning reputations to reporters. Thus it does not incur
the management overhead of traditional services, and can
therefore scale to millions of reporters.
Prior work also includes proposals for collaborative spam
filtering [3], [37], [38]. CloudMark [1], as does SocialFilter,
explicitly addresses the issue of trustworthiness of the collabo-
rating spam reporters through a distributed reporter reputation
management system based on history of past interactions.
However, they do not leverage the social network to derive
trust information. Kong et al. [21] also consider untrustworthy
reporters, using Eigentrust for deriving their reputation. The
aforementioned solutions only enable classifying the contents
of emails and not the source of spam. This requires email
servers to waste resources on email reception and filtering.
SocialFilter can assign trust metrics to sources, thereby reject-
ing unwanted email traffic on the outset.
Similar to SocialFilter, RepuScore [30] is also a collabora-
tive reputation management framework, which allows partici-
pating organizations to establish sender accountability on the
basis of senders past actions. However, it does not exploit the
social network of RepuScore server admins.
SocialFilter’s identity uniqueness is based on SybilGuard
and SybilLimit [34], [35], where the resource test in ques-
tion is a Sybil attacker’s ability to create and sustain social
acquaintances. SybilGuard/Limit were designed to operate in
a decentralized setting in which nodes are not aware of the
complete social graph. We use a stripped-down centralized
version of SybilLimit, because in our setting the OSN provider
has complete knowledge of the social graph’s topology.
Prior work has also exploited trust in social networks to
reliably assess the trustworthiness of entities [12], [17], [26],
[29], [39]. Unlike SocialFilter, they do not use social links to
both bootstrap trust values between socially acquainted nodes
and defend against Sybil attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented SocialFilter, a large scale distributed
system for the rapid propagation of reports concerning the
behavior of email senders. SocialFilter nodes use each other’s
reports and the social network of their human users to provide
to applications a quantitative measure of an email sender’s
trustworthiness: the likelihood that the sender is spamming.
Applications can in turn use this measure to make informed
decisions on how to handle traffic associated with the host in
question.
Our simulation-based comparative evaluation demonstrated
our design’s potential for the suppression of spam email.
SocialFilter was able to identify 92% of spam connections
with greater than 50% confidence. Furthermore, in contrast to
a competing social-network-based spam mitigation technique,
Ostra [23], SocialFilter exhibited no false positives.
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